Epistemic Trust and Source Evaluation as Psychological Mechanisms of Students’ Evidence-Based Thinking

Authors

  • Raximova Aziza Davranbekovna University of Innovation Technologies, Uzbekistan

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.55640/jsshrf-06-06-10

Keywords:

Epistemic trust, source evaluation, evidence-based thinking

Abstract

This article examines epistemic trust and source evaluation as psychological mechanisms that support students’ evidence-based thinking in higher education. The purpose of the study is to clarify how students decide which information sources deserve trust, how they evaluate the credibility of knowledge claims, and how these processes influence their ability to reason on the basis of evidence. The findings show that students’ evidence-based thinking depends not only on cognitive skills such as analysis and comparison, but also on deeper psychological mechanisms, including epistemic vigilance, calibrated trust, source credibility judgment, intellectual autonomy, and reflective regulation. Epistemic trust is shown to be productive when it is neither blind acceptance nor radical skepticism, but a balanced psychological orientation that allows students to rely on credible expertise while maintaining responsibility for verification. Source evaluation, in turn, functions as a practical mechanism through which epistemic trust is regulated. The article concludes that the development of evidence-based thinking in students requires systematic educational conditions that strengthen their ability to assess source expertise, reliability, transparency, argument quality, and contextual relevance.

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Published

2026-06-29

How to Cite

Raximova Aziza Davranbekovna. (2026). Epistemic Trust and Source Evaluation as Psychological Mechanisms of Students’ Evidence-Based Thinking. Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Research Fundamentals, 6(06), 50–55. https://doi.org/10.55640/jsshrf-06-06-10