Fortifying Software Supply Chains: Integrative Frameworks, SBOM Practices, and Vulnerability Mitigation Strategies
Keywords:
Software supply chain, security assessment, SBOM, vulnerability taxonomyAbstract
Ensuring the integrity and security of software supply chains has become an imperative priority for both industry and academia, propelled by an ever‑increasing scale of interdependencies across codebases, open‑source components, and automated pipelines. This research article explores the multifaceted landscape of software supply chain security, integrating foundational sociological and methodological frameworks with cutting‑edge technical insights from vulnerability analysis, secure acquisition processes, and automated security assessment mechanisms. Beginning with a thorough examination of sociological inquiry principles tailored to complex system analysis (Blackstone et al., 2018), and usability measurement in security contexts (Albert & Tullis, 2013), the study lays out a robust theoretical foundation. It synthesizes empirical evidence on supply chain vulnerabilities arising from trivial package usage (Abdalkareem et al., 2020), software identity frameworks (Singi et al., 2019), and reclaiming visibility through Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) practice challenges (Bi et al., 2024; Shukla, 2025). By adopting mixed‑method research strategies—including snowball sampling (Goodman, 1961) and active learning approaches for vulnerability elimination (Vasilakis et al., 2021)—the study documents the emergent threats and proposes an integrative taxonomy of security risks (Barabanov et al., 2018) and practical intervention strategies (Shukla, 2025). Through comprehensive analysis and detailed discussion, this research clarifies conceptual gaps, contributes to extending current taxonomies of threats, and articulates actionable frameworks for practitioners and researchers to fortify software supply chains. The implications are far‑reaching, influencing secure software acquisition, automated detection mechanisms (Ohm et al., 2020), and broader ecosystem trust considerations (Boughton et al., 2024). The article concludes with strategic recommendations for future work to bridge gaps in secure practices and automation scalability.
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